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This paper looks at how income tax rates, consumption and public spending respond as 
venues for tax evasion open or close. The analysis draws on a 16-generation OLG model in 
which tax rates are determined in a repeated game between voters and a rent-seeking 
Leviathan government. Key insights are: (1) Effects on any generation alive when change 
takes place may differ substantially from steady state effects that accrue for generations yet 
to be born. (2) There is considerable intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not 
monotonous as we move from young to old. Combined, these results suggest that the 
political economy of pertinent institutional change may be quite complex. 
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E2, E62, F42, H2 1 Introduction
This paper’s key question is whether opportunities for tax evasion, such as
through bank accounts protected by bank secrecy laws, may lower tax rates
and provide an eﬀective check on government spending. The rationale for
asking this question is that such eﬀects may improve welfare. This could
only be the case, of course, if taxes and government spending levels were
excessive in the sense that they are not representative of what society actually
wants. For this to happen, imperfections in the political market or process
are required that generate an upward bias in public spending and tax rates.
The claim that banking secrecy does foreign countries a service as well by
reducing the eﬀective tax burden of its citizens and keeping their Leviathan
governments in check is a familiar part of the political rhetoric of tax haven
countries. However, the argument has also been advanced in academic work,
as exempliﬁed by Boadway and Keen (1998) who conclude that their results
“may point ... to a useful social purpose for tax havens”. In their model, in
which only capital income is subject to taxation, the government is unable to
commit to a tax rate ex ante, before households make their saving decision.
Households do anticipate the resulting incentive to raise taxes after savings
decisions have been made. As a result, there is a bias in tax rates that
puts them above the socially optimal rate that would obtain if a proper
commitment devise existed [see also Fischer (1980), Rogers (1987) and Chari
et al. (1989)]. The solution recommended by Boadway and Keen is for the
government to precommit to a low level of enforcement of existing tax laws,
which they consider easier than precommitment to a lower tax rate, and this
way facilitate tax evasion and generate a lower eﬀective tax rate.
This is a strong and potentially provocative result. In order to gauge its
robustness and shed additional light on the issue of national and international
repercussions of banking secrecy and tax evasion in general, this paper moves
beyond the model employed by Boadway and Keen (1998), both in the way
the macroeconomy is being modelled, and with respect to the emphasis it
allots the political process.
Regarding the economy, Boadway and Keen use a representative agent,
2-period partial equilibrium framework in which income and the capital stock
are exogenous. Our analysis features an inﬁnite horizon general equilibrium
model with heterogenous households. This permits a more comprehensive
analysis of macroeconomic steady-state eﬀects, a ﬁrst look at intergenera-
tional conﬂict, and, due to the inclusion of 16 generations, the derivation of
1quite realistic and reﬁned medium-run dynamics.
The political processes does not play an explicit role in the Boadman and
Keen paper. Implicitly, though, the fact that the government and society
share identical preferences may be attributed to perfect competition in the
political arena. As already mentioned above, a Leviathan eﬀect obtains be-
cause socially optimal low tax rates are not time consistent. This causes an
upward bias in tax rates that not only voters but the government as well
would like to get rid of. Hence, there is no conﬂict of interest between the
government and the electorate, and anything that weakens the mechanisms
provoking the tax bias helps cutting Leviathan to size. Such conﬂict is at
the very core of our model, however. Mainly as a driving force behind the
game the rent-seeking government (that beneﬁts from high tax rates) plays
with the voting public (who tries to prevent costly lame-duck behaviour on
the part of the government). But also because institutional change bears dif-
ferently on generations alive and generations yet to be born, and may even
have quite contrasting eﬀects on diﬀerent generations currently alive. All this
renders the issue of how to reduce the Leviathan eﬀect a lot more complex
and interesting.
In order to achieve maximum leverage for any results that might obtain
from this papers analysis, we model government Leviathan in its most ex-
treme form, postulating that the public wants no public spending at all, and
all public spending is the sole result of rent-seeking behaviour by politicians.
The speciﬁc description of the political process we employ is the electoral con-
trol model proposed by Ferejohn (1986); used extensively in the pertinent lit-
erature. This game theoretic speciﬁcation of how voters and the government
interact is combined with a 16-generation overlapping generations model in
which generations are born one election period apart to match the rhythm in
which political decisions are being made. The added beneﬁt from equipping
the economy with a relatively large set of heterogeneous agents spaced apart
by relatively short periods only is that it generates rather detailed dynamics,
provides insights into intergenerational diversity and the political prospects
for institutional change, and may serve as a point of departure for future
work that looks at political decision processes explicitly and more closely.
The idea that governments should be thought of as self-serving Leviathans
rather than as maximisers of social welfare has a long history in political phi-
losophy (typical citations are taken from the writings of James Mill and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau). Formal economic models abound in the public choice
literature. Of particular importance here are Niskanen (1971) and Brennan
2and Buchanan (1980). Our topic is related to the literature on tax compe-
tition and information exchange, but this literature typically maintains that
each country’s government seeks to maximize the utility of its inhabitants.
Moreover, our concern is not to analyze the strategic interaction of diﬀerent
countries [see Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000); Kollintzas et al. (2000);
Huizinga and Nielsen (2003); Marchand et al. (2003); and Eggert and Kol-
mar (2004)], but to investigate how changes between diﬀerent regimes of
information exchange impact diﬀerent groups.
Section 2 develops our overlapping generations model with Leviathan
government, gives some analytical results, and discusses steady states as
they obtain when no opportunities for tax evasion exist. Section 3 looks at
dynamics. For that purpose, we simulate a calibrated numerical version and
track both the response of aggregate variables and the behavior of individual
generations to institutional change toward and away from arrangements with
banking secrecy. Section 4 sums up and provides an outlook on possible
future reﬁnements and extensions.
2 An OLG model with Leviathan government
2.1 The economy
We use a small open economy overlapping generations (OLG) model featur-
ing 16 generations. The reason why we are looking at more than the two
generations often employed in OLG models is that this permits us to look at
transition dynamics and generational diversity in a realistic fashion. Sixteen
generations seem appropriate for our purposes, as they insinuate a period
length of some four years, the length of an election period, which plays a key
role in our model. A new generation is born at the beginning of a new elec-
tion term. Each generation supplies a ﬁxed labor input which is normalized
to 1 during the ﬁrst 12 periods of its life time. After that it retires and lives
solely from its savings plus interest. Individuals are born without wealth and
leave no bequests. For ease of notation we identify generations by noting how
many periods they have left to live after the current period. Accordingly, the
oldest generation is generation 0, while generation 15 is the youngest. Net




t − δkt, (1)
3where kt is the capital stock per worker, α is capital’s share of output, and δ
denotes the depreciation rate. Both capital and labor markets are perfectly





wt = (1 − α)k
α
t ,
where rt is the real period (not annualized) interest rate and wt is the wage
rate. Declared wage and interest income is taxed at a ﬂat period rate τt. Wage
income is always fully declared, while, depending on the judicial setting,
households may or may not use means such as banking secrecy (BS) to evade
taxes on interest income. We assume that tax evasion generates a cost of ζ
per unit earned on interest rates on secret bank accounts.1
Households deposit a ﬁxed fraction f of their wealth in secret bank ac-
counts. The resulting after-tax interest and wage rates are given by
rnet,t =
 
(1 − τt)(1 − f) + (1 − ζ)f
 
rt
wnet,t = (1 − τt)wt,
Each country’s size is negligible compared to the world economy. We assume
perfect capital markets and that capital income is taxed according to resi-
dence. International interest rate parity requires that the per worker capital
stock is level across countries, so unilateral policy choices will not have an
impact on output or wages.
In general equilibrium models with government, households typically de-
rive utility from private consumption and from their government’s provision
of public goods. The lifetime utility of the representative member of gener-





j (logcn−j,t+j + ψ loggt+j), (2)
1Costs of tax evasion come in many forms. They involve the risk of punishment for
evading taxes in the spirit of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), psychological costs of deviat-
ing from personal norms (Schnellenbach, 2006), losses resulting from the need to conceal
the buying power from this kind of illegal income by putting it to ineﬃcient use, and,
probably most directly, withholding taxes levied by the country that is oﬀering secret
bank accounts.
4where cn−j,t+j is period t + j consumption of generation n − j, gt+j the
level of public good provision per capita in the same period, ψ the weight
of public goods in households’ utility, and β households’ subjective time-
discount factor. Our extreme, pure Leviathan model obtains by letting ψ
equal zero. Then government spending generates no utility for households
at all. We denote the net wealth (the sum of the market value of assets
held and future net wage earnings discounted at the after tax interest rate)
of a representative individual of generation n by νn. Since the youngest
generation starts out without any assets, its net wealth, ν15,t is given solely
by the discounted value of future net salaries
ν15,t = (1 − τt)wnet,t +
12  
j=1
(1 − τt+j)wnet,t+j  j
i=1(1 + rnet,t+i)




1 − βn+1νn,t, (3)
implying that their net wealth evolves according to
νn−1,t+1 = (1 + rnet,t+1)
β − βn+1
1 − βn+1 νn,t. (4)
Net interest rates, as determinants of net wealth, depend on income tax
rates. These are determined in a game between voters and the government
which we now describe and analyze.
2.2 The game between voters and the government
In order to provide an explanation of tax rates with Leviathan-government
ﬂavor, this section augments the OLG model described above with a version
of Ferejohn’s (1986) electoral control model. This model has become a staple
in political macroeconomics with a wide range of applications (e.g., Rogoﬀ,
1990 or Persson et al., 2000). It assumes that politicians are pure rent seekers.
When in power, they have the discretion to tax net income at any rate they
deem appropriate. But the constitution prevents them from the outright
expropriaton of private assets.
Politicians maximize income. When in oﬃce, income comes in two forms:
First, they receive an explicit salary which they cannot inﬂuence. For the
5sake of parsimony, we assume that it equals the salary which they could
earn in other positions. Second, politicians can gain additional income by
pursing activities which favor special consumer or producer groups. We are
interested in this second type of income, generated through rent-seeking be-
havior. These rents may accrue openly and legally, say as payments from
recipients of government contracts in the form of campaign contributions,
promises of future employment, or lecture fees (Stigler, 1971; Barro, 1973).
In countries with weak legal rules and enforcement, in particular, such in-
come may also arrive through concealed, illegal channels such as bribes and
other forms of corruption. Following Barro (1973) we let government rent
be generated through factor overpayment in public procurement. It is thus
proportional to (certain parts of) government spending.
When determining government spending, we assume that the government
budget must balance on a period-by-period basis, which, in our context,
means over an election term. For a tax base bt and a tax rate τt, government
spending per capita is thus given by
gt = τtbt (5)
Further, assume that some part of government spending is not discre-
tionary, but mandated by a country’s constitution or other legal commit-
ments (schools, public hospitals, etc.), by international treaties or standards
suggested by supranational institutions. For simplicity we let this part of
government spending be ﬁxed at ¯ g. We assume that such non discretionary
spending does not generate rent for the government. So rents are linear
in that part of government spending that exceeds the legal minimum. The
period t rent ξt generated by such discretionary spending is thus given by
ξt = ξ (gt − ¯ g)
= ξ (τtbt − ¯ g)
(6)
Within a given period (or term in oﬃce), the government would maximize
its rent by driving up the tax rate to 100 percent. This short-run incentive
is counterbalanced by its desire to get reelected and thus be able to collect
rents in the future as well. Voters are aware of this eﬀect and adopt a simple
performance oriented (retrospective) voting rule: If the tax rate τt set by
the government does not exceed a threshold ¯ τt, the current government gets
reelected. Otherwise it receives zero votes and a new government is elected
from an inﬁnite pool of other parties. Once out of oﬃce, a former government
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never returns to power. There are no mechanisms by which a government
can credibly pre-commit to a policy unless it is ex-post rational. The timing
of this simple game is visualized by the sequence of events given in ﬁgure 1.
Given the voting rule mentioned above, the reigning rent-seeking govern-
ment has two options: First, to maximize the current period rent by setting
τ=100% , and accept being voted out of oﬃce. Second, to settle for a tax rate
¯ τt that gets it reelected. Choosing a tax rate below ¯ τt will never be optimal,
of course, because a marginal increase in the tax rate would increase revenues
without impeding chances for reelection. Also, no rational government will
ever pick a tax rate in the range between ¯ τt and 100%, because a tax rate of
100% provides higher rents and identical reelection prospects.
The challenge for the electorate is to set incentives for the government in
such a manner that it always opts for a tax rate of ¯ τt and never for one of
100%. The criterion for this can be found by recursion. Given that it will be
optimal for the government to choose τt+j = ¯ τt+j in all future periods t + j
and that its discount rate is βg, this choice is also optimal at time t if the
maximal current period rent does not exceed the present value of the stream
7of future rents when in power. Formally,





gξ (¯ τt+jbt+j − ¯ g) (7)
From the perspective of the electorate, this is the incentive compatibility
constraint. The optimal tax rate ¯ τt is the one that makes (7) hold with
equality. Rearranging (7) gives













Equation (8) provides some insights at to why ¯ τ might ﬂuctuate over time.
The second term will be larger (in an absolute sense), the smaller the current
tax base is relative to its long run value. This reﬂects that incumbents have
more to gain from staying in oﬃce when the tax base is rising. As we can
see from the last term, a growing tax base leads to lower tax rates, as the
fraction of revenues necessary to cover non-discretionary spendings decrease.
Our political-economic OLG model can be used to identify government
behavior and the state of the economy under diﬀerent institutional settings.
We look at two such settings. One that does not provide windows of op-
portunity for tax evasion. Here f, the fraction of wealth concealed from tax
authorities, equals zero. And one setting in which such opportunity lures, as
would be the case when foreign countries oﬀer secret bank accounts. Here f
takes some positive value between zero and one, which we treat as a constant
in our analysis. We start be brieﬂy discussing steady states under the two
institutional settings. We then proceed to look at the dynamic responses
triggered when one institutional setting is dropped in favor of the other.
2.3 Steady states with and without banking secrecy
Steady state solutions are obtained by removing all time indices. Doing this
in equation (8) yields the steady-state tax rate




Without banking secrecy (or with banking secrecy and information exchange
between countries), the tax base equals GDP. The larger the fraction f of
8interest income hidden from the tax authority, the lower is the tax base
relative to GDP, and the higher is the tax rate set by the government in
equilibrium. Hence, parts of the revenue lost due to tax evasion is recaptured
through higher oﬃcial tax rates.
The labor supply is ﬁxed in our setup. So the eﬀect of tax evasion on
GDP, on the gross wage rate, and on the gross interest rate will be determined
by its eﬀect on the capital stock.2 In the new steady state with tax evasion,
taxes are shifted from capital income to labor. This is because the tax rate
eﬀectively paid on wage income equals the oﬃcial tax rate, while the tax
rate eﬀectively paid on interest income, part of which evades being taxed, is
below the oﬃcial tax rate. This raises eﬀective post-tax interest rates, which
translates into higher savings rates.
Since subsequent sections report dynamic eﬀects relative to steady states,
it is useful to note that while aggregates do not change in the steady state,
generational dynamics occurs nevertheless. Since the discussion of dynamic
responses to institutional change in section 3 requires a calibrated version of
our model, we also provide quantitative steady-state patterns for reference.
To this end, the model is calibrated as follows: The production function
parameter α is set to 0.3. Capital depreciates by 40 percent each period
(12 percent per year). Both the household and government discount rates
are set to 0.9. To generate a government share of GDP of 50 percent with
banking secrecy, we set non-discretionary government spending (¯ g) to 45
percent of the equilibrium GDP under banking secrecy. The cost of receiving
undeclared interest income (ζ) is set to 0.2. The fraction of their wealth
that are kept in secret bank accounts when these are available, f, is set
to 10 percent. The solution algoritms we use are described in appendix
B. The solid line in ﬁgure 2 has two interpretations. The ﬁrst is timeless,
since it indicates the consumption levels of the sixteen generations alive at
an arbitrary point in time, after the economy has settled into a steady state
without banking secrecy, with the youngest generation positioned left and the
oldest on the right. This line may also be given a dynamic interpretation.
Since households move from left to right as they get older, the line also shows
the life time consumption proﬁle of a representative household. The fact
that consumption falls during a households life implies that our calibration
2We noted above that each individual country is small, so that it its repercussions on
the global economy are negligible. When all individual countries respond in the same way,
however, this does aﬀect the global capital stock.
9Figure 2: Steady state consumption proﬁles

































generates a steady-state real interest rate that falls short of the time discount
rate. The dashed line provides the same kind of information for a steady state
with banking secrecy. The fact that the pattern has become ﬂatter indicates
that the eﬀective post-tax real interest rate has increased. It still remains
below the time discount rate, though, since households continue to favor early
consumption.
For those generations who work, the higher oﬃcial tax rates means lower
net wage rates, but the eﬀect of the higher eﬀective interest rate on the
savings rate turns out to be strong enough to compensate this eﬀect for all
generations. The upshot is a higher capital stock with secret bank accounts.
Through the production function, a higher capital stock also drives up GDP
and the wage rate, but has a dampening eﬀect on the interest rate.
3 Dynamic responses to institutional change
Life time in OLG models is ﬁnite, and many, if not all, generations currently
alive, may not live to enjoy whatever promises a distant new steady state
may bear. When discussing the welfare implications of institutional change,
therefore, and even more so when evaluating prospects for its political im-
plementation, we need to look at the model’s dynamics during the life time
10of today’s voting population. For this purpose, the current section analyzes
the transitions paths to (from) an institutional design with banking secrecy
from (to) one without (or with information exchange) in a numerical version
of our model.
3.1 Introducing banking secrecy
3.1.1 Aggregate dynamics
Figure 3 shows how tax rates, the tax base, the capital stock and consumption
respond to the establishment of secret bank accounts. All time paths are
relative to the steady-state values that obtain without banking secrecy. In
period -1 the economy is still in a steady state without any opportunities
for tax evasion. In period 0 both the government and households learn that
starting next period, secret bank accounts will be available. Households
respond to this by keeping a fraction f of their assets in such accounts in
period 1 and after. For now we assume that this reallocation takes time, so
that households respond to what they learned with a lag of one period.
The upper left panel shows that the tax rate spikes in the announcement
period, period 0. It drops in period 1, and then recedes slowly toward its
new equilibrium value, which is higher than the old one. This observed initial
spike is due to the drop in politicians’ rent anticipated to follow the future
opening of channels for tax evasion. In period 0, households have not had the
opportunity yet to react to this opening. The tax base, the sum of wage and
interest income, therefore, is still the same as in the previous steady state. In
this old steady state, voters disciplined the government by letting it tax just
enough to render it indiﬀerent between the tax rate that is just moderate
enough to get the government reelected at all future elections, and a tax
rate of 100 percent, followed by being ousted from oﬃce at the next election.
Politicians know that tax evasion made possible by secret bank accounts will
eat into the tax base in the near future. So, unless voters adjust the tax
rate at which they reelect the government (¯ τ0), the incentive compatibility
constraint of inequality (7) will be violated.
The initial spike also impedes wealth accumulation and reverberates in
the following periods in the form of an initially lower capital stock (lower
left panel). This adds to the drop in the tax base that follows households
shift of assets abroad (upper right panel). As we move ahead in time, the
capital stock not only rebounds, but soars above its initial level thanks to
11Figure 3: Introducing banking secrecy: The aggregate perspective




































































the lower eﬀective tax rate that banking secrecy implies. This slight rebound
of the tax base is perfectly foreseen, and, as we know from the discussion of
equation (8), will lead to a further decrease in tax rates as a smaller fraction
of revenues needs to be set aside to cover non-discretionary spendings.
Aggregate consumption (lower right panel) is initially also dented by the
initial tax hike, but also by a temporal shift in households’ consumption
proﬁles (see below). After some periods below the old level, it recovers as
the eﬀect of the consumption shifts are smoothed out, the tax burden eases,
and aggregate wealth reaches its new, higher long run level.
The key lesson to be taken from the ﬁgure is how the equilibrium tax
rate tracks future shifts in the tax base. If, as initially, the current tax base
is higher than that of the next few periods, incentive compatibility requires
¯ τ to be increased. If, as from period 2 on, the tax base is on an ascending
12trajectory, politicians would be willing to accept temporary lower tax rates,
but this eﬀect will be muted or dominated by a decrease in the fraction of
revenues needed to cover basic government services over time.
3.1.2 Generational dynamics
Aggregate dynamics, as given in ﬁgure 3, provide an incomplete picture in
an OLG model. First, because diﬀerent generations alive deviate from the
average or beneﬁt from the average in diﬀerent ways. And second, because
even if all generations’ consumption would exactly follow the path of ag-
gregate consumption shown in ﬁgure 3, each generation would be able to
move along this path for a diﬀerent length of time. Thus the present value
of consumption dynamics triggered by the introduction of banking secrecy
abroad would be diﬀerent for each generation. This section, therefore, looks
behind the aggregates shown in ﬁgure 3 and discusses how each generation’s
consumption is being aﬀected.
The lower panel of ﬁgure 4 shows the added consumption during each
period of a households lifetime required to make the the household indiﬀerent
between the two institutional settings.3 Generations are ordered from old
to young. Interestingly, the eﬀect is not monotonous in the sense that it
changes in one direction as we move from younger toward older generations.
Both the oldest generation and the eleven youngest generations suﬀer from
the introduction of banking secrecy. The four other generations do welcome
banking secrecy. To understand this pattern, it helps to note that those who
beneﬁt are the generations who will still be alive when banking secrecy is
eventually implemented, which happens in period 1, and will then have to
3For each generation, this is computed as the percentage shift in the consumption path
from previous steady state which would make it indiﬀerent between remaining in the old
regime and switching to the regime with secret bank accounts. Denoting the hypothetical
consumption that would have accrued in the old steady state by ˆ c we ﬁnd the equivalent
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14make a living out of interest income and accumulated wealth alone. Those
who suﬀer are the other generations. The generation shown all the way on the
left, lives only during the period when the implementation of banking secrecy
is announced (but not yet implemented) and the government responds by
raising tax rates. This lowers its disposable income and consumption, which
remains the only eﬀect it experiences before it passes away. The eleven
youngest generations will all have to work under banking secrecy and pay
higher taxes and save out of lower disposable income during that time. This
apparently dominates all positive eﬀects BS may have on their consumption
via a build-up of the capital stock and lower eﬀective tax rates during their
years of retirement.
To provide an even more detailed picture, the upper panel shows con-
sumption paths for each individual generation. Please note that these are de-
viations from the no-banking-secrecy steady-state consumption paths shown
in ﬁgure 2. So while the paths in the top panel of ﬁgure 4 are predominantly
ascending, the ascend is relative to the descending steady-state paths of ﬁg-
ure 2. Since these steady-state paths descend more steeply, this dominates
the steady-state paths with banking secrecy still. So consumption falls dur-
ing the remaining life time for most generations, but less so in a scenario
without banking secrecy.
Let us ﬁrst look at the uppermost path which is actually four paths
stacked on top of each other. Paths have been deliberately displaced just
a tad to make it even visible that we are looking at four paths rather than
one. The four paths are for the four generations already in retirement when
the future implementation of BS is being announced. These generations are
all being aﬀected in the same way each period, but for a diﬀerent number of
periods.
All retired generations live from the consumption of wealth accumulated
during their working lives, and from the interest income this wealth still
generates. The oldest generation unambiguously loses from the introduction
of secret bank accounts. The reason is that its disposable income is being
aﬀected full force by the spike in the tax rate that hits their consumption
during their only period left to live. The three other generations also in
retirement already, suﬀer from this blow the same way. However, they also
beneﬁt during subsequent periods from the actual introduction of secret bank
accounts. The combination of income tax rates at home coming down again
and the possibility to actually move part of their wealth abroad lets them
enjoy lower eﬀective tax rates for the remaining part of their lives. As this
15drives eﬀective post-tax interest rates below their steady-state value, meaning
that today’s consumption is reduced in favor of more consumption tomorrow,
this creates an ascending consumption path of retired generations who live
to see secret bank accounts implemented.
Intertemporal substitution of current consumption in favor of later con-
sumption is also the key mechanism behind the upward-sloping consumption
paths of those generations who still hold jobs in period 0. Two features need
explanation there, however. First, why is the announcement-related drop in
period 0 the larger, the longer the remaining work life? Second, why does
consumption for generations still young continue to fall in period 1, while it
is already rising for the older working generations?
In answering the ﬁrst question we note that because wage income is taxed
at the oﬃcial tax rate, which increases when the introduction of bank secrecy
is being announced, banking secrecy triggers a shift of taxation from capital
income to wage income. This hurts those generations most who are still
early in their careers and adds to the reduction in current consumption that
is already being caused by the anticipated rise in after-tax interest rates.
Regarding the second question, those generations with the longest work-
ing lives ahead have not accumulated any wealth worth talking about yet.
Their disposable income will be aﬀected strongly by the drop in the capital
stock in period 1 and by the detrimental eﬀect this has on their labor income.
The older a generation is and the larger its accumulated wealth, the more
likely this negative eﬀect on wages will be oﬀset by the new opportunity to
move ﬁnancial wealth abroad and receive a tax-free return.
3.2 Abolishing banking secrecy
Institutional change in the opposite direction, toward an abolition of banking
secrecy, simply mirrors the patterns described above, when it is being imple-
mented in the same fashion. In order not to become repetitive and broaden
our insights while looking at this case, we now assume that banking secrecy
is being discarded unexpectedly, without previous announcement.
Again, we start by looking at the dynamic response of aggregate variables,
shown in ﬁgure 5. With the regime change, happening in period 0, the
tax base jumps (north-east panel), because those parts of wealth which up
until now were hidden from the tax authority are now subject to taxation.
Reﬂecting this jump in the tax base, the tax rate drops (north-west panel).
The dominant factor in this drop is the lower fraction of revenues needed
16Figure 5: Abolishing banking secrecy: The aggregate perspective



































































to cover non-discretionary spendings. There is not much dynamics in the
subsequent movements of the tax base or the tax rate, since both variables
jump into the neighborhood of their new steady states instantly. Whatever
movement happens after, is not very signiﬁcant in quantitative terms, and
reﬂects the eﬀect of the falling capital stock on output (lower left panel). The
response of consumption is interesting (lower right panel). It jumps upward
when banking secrecy is being abolished, reﬂecting the drop in the tax rate,
which has not aﬀected the capital stock yet, and intertemporal substitution
toward earlier periods for all generations.
This shift in consumption patterns is clearly recognizable in the upper
panel of ﬁgure 6, which looks behind aggregates at individual generations. All
generations, except the ﬁve oldest, have higher consumption in the periods
immediately following the abolition of banking secrecy, but lower consump-

















































































































18tion toward the end of their life-cycles. As with the introduction of banking
secrecy, the tilting of the consumption proﬁles is mainly due to changes in
the eﬀective interest rate. Without banking secrecy it is lower because all
interest income is subject to the domestic tax rate.
The lower panel shows the winners and losers of the postulated insti-
tutional change. The eﬀects mirror—but not perfectly so—what we saw
happening after the introduction of banking secrecy. Since we assume that
BS is dropped unexpectedly, the oldest generation also loses with this pol-
icy shift. Apart from that, the pattern is more or less the opposite of what
happened after the introduction of BS. Retired generations, as well as those
in the late periods of their work life lose because they derive all or most of
their income from their ﬁnancial assets. The new oﬃcial tax rate is lower
without banking secrecy and this beneﬁts the younger generations who have
many working periods ahead of them.
4 Summary and outlook
The main question asked in this paper was to what extent institutional fea-
tures that facilitate tax evasion may keep Leviathan governments at bay. The
speciﬁc feature we looked at was banking secrecy, at home or abroad, but
most results would seem to apply to other institutional features facilitating
tax evasion as well. The answer to the main question depends on how one
deﬁnes Leviathan, or the government:
When taking income tax rates as a measure of government power abuse,
tax evasion feeds Leviathan. Even with an extreme speciﬁcation of Leviathan
governments, in which all public spending is forced upon households and does
not even feature in their utility function, tax rates go up. Since this is accom-
panied by a dramatically shrinking tax base, however, due to a substantial
part of income now being concealed from tax authorities, taxes per capita do
indeed fall. Households beneﬁt from this through higher consumption that
eventually moves beyond previous levels, made possible by a growing capital
stock and lower eﬀective tax rates.
These are all steady-state eﬀects, however, and some of them take sub-
stantial time to materialize, a highly relevant aspect when life time is ﬁnite.
Looking into this, our analysis has shown that the eﬀects of institutional
change in terms of introducing banking secrecy, or removing it, are quite
complex. Not only may patterns diﬀer substantially between generations,
19but present values of changes in consumption also crucially depend on gener-
ational status, which deﬁnes expected remaining life time, and on the speed
at which institutional change is conducted and on the element of surprise it
contains. The immediate eﬀect of announcing the introduction of BS is a
drop in consumption. This drop is the more pronounced, the longer is the
remaining life time of a household. For many, this drop may be followed by a
further fall in consumption when BS is actually implemented, and households
by never be able to make up for these losses during later stages of their lives.
When the introduction of BS is pre-announced, the net eﬀect on a majority
of households is negative. When the introduction catches the economy by
surprise, a majority may beneﬁt.
Future work may extend our analysis in a number of directions. For one
thing, our deﬁnition of Leviathan may be softened to a less extreme version.
As the model stands now, cutbacks in government spending do not matter to
households, as public consumption does not generate utility. Figures 7 and 8
oﬀer a glimpse at how this may bear on results by showing how government
spending per capita responds to an announced and to a surprise removal of
banking secrecy. Dynamic and present-value eﬀects on consumption, already
shown in sections 3.1 and 3.2, are also included for easy reference.
What catches the eye is the downward spike in government spending
when next period’s abolishment of BS is announced (ﬁgure 7). This reﬂects
the downward spike in the tax rate (the opposite of what we have seen in
ﬁgure 2), and is so severe that subsequent higher levels of government spend-
ing never make up for it during the life times of all generations currently
alive. This spike is absent when there is no previous announcement (ﬁgure
8). Therefore, the eﬀect on all generations is positive. What is interesting
is that there seems to be a trade oﬀ: A pre-announced abolishment of BS
beneﬁts most households from the perspective of consumption, but hurts
public consumption for all. Abolishment in a surprise move hurts a major-
ity of households from the perspective of consumption, but improves public
consumption for all. We need to emphasize, however, that the governments-
spending patterns have been computed in a model in which they do not yield
utility. So households do not care about the patterns shown in ﬁgures 7 and
8. Making public consumption a determinant of household utility would also
aﬀect the game between households and the government and bear on the
paths of other variables as well.
Beyond measures of aggregate or generational welfare, any evaluation of
prospects for political change, or persistence, needs to dig deeper into the
























































































































































































































21Figure 8: Government spendings eﬀects: Surprise abolishment


























































































































































































































22political process. Thus, future work may make the option for institutional
change part of the political game, and consider the interaction between the
government and the median-voter generation in an eﬀort to model the polit-
ical part of the model more realistically.
23Appendices
A Consumers’ maximization problem
In this section we derive equation (3) from the consumers’ maximization
problem. We proceed by proving an expression for the value function. The
optimal consumption rule will follow as a by-product. This is a standard
dynamic programming exercise and it is quite likely that it could be found
elsewhere. Denoting the sequence of interest rates over all periods by {R}
and the current period gross interest rate by Rt, we show that the value




logνj + Tj({R},β), (10)
where Tj is a catch-all term for all variables unrelated to the wealth level.





i (logcj−i) = logcj + βVj−1(νj−1,{R},β)
,
Proof: [By induction] In the last period of its life cycle, an generation con-
sumes all its wealth. It follows that V0(ν0,{R},β) = logν0, so it holds for

















The ﬁrst order condition for a maximum of the expression in the curvy paren-
thesis implies that νj−1 should be set to
νj−1 = R
β − βj+1
1 − βj νj.
It follows that the generation consumes
cj =
1 − β
1 − βj+1νj. (11)
24Substituting for νj−1 in the value function and rearranging gives


















which completes inductive step and hence the proof. Since we just proved




Solving for the steady states with and without banking secrecy is straight
forward. From equation (9), we know the equilibrium tax rate under both
regimes. The only state variable in the model is the capital stock. For a
constant capital stock, the wage and interest rate, as well as consumption
and savings for each generation are given by the formulas in section 2.1. The
equilibrium capital stock is that at which net savings over all generations is
zero.
B.2 Transition dynamics
Solving for the transition dynamics between the two tax regimes is somewhat
more complicated. Using the solutions for the steady states, we know the
starting position of the economy (old steady state), as well as its new long
run equilibrium. At any point in time, households savings depend on the
current state of the economy as well as the expected path for capital stock
and the tax rate. The path for the tax rate depends on the evolution of
the capital stock (which determines the tax base) as well as expected future
tax rates. Using {ˆ kt+j}∞
j=1, {ˆ τt+j}∞
j=1, to denote the expected trajectories for
the capital stock and the tax rates, a solution for the equilibrium transition
dynamics is given when the realized paths equal their expectations.
25We use the following procedure to arrive at the equilibrium path. Let T
be a period far ahead by which all adjustment dynamics should be completed.
For period T as well as all following periods we assume that all variables are
at their new equilibrium values.
1. Assume an arbitrary path of the capital stock and tax rate for the
transition. (E.g. use a linear interpolation for both series.)
2. Compute new series for both variables as follows
(a) For given {ˆ kt+j}T
j=1, {ˆ τt+j}T
j=1, and initial capital stock, compute
aggregate period savings. Use this number as the capital stock for
the period t + 1. Then use the same procedure to compute the
capital stock for t + 2, etc. This yields a new estimate {˜ kt+j}T
j=1
for capital trajectory, as well as an estimated trajectory for the
tax base {˜ bt+j}T
j=1.
(b) Collect the expected values in equation (8) into a variable B, so










In the new equilibrium, B is given by B = βg/(1−βg)¯ τssbss, where
we use the subscript ss to denote a steady state. Starting oﬀ in
period T, we compute the expected T tax rate by ˆ τT = 1−B/˜ bT.
Given this value for period T, we compute B for period T − 1
as B′ = βgˆ τTˆ bT + βgB. Repeating the procedure for until we are
back in the period where the regime change took place yields an
updated series of expected tax rates {ˆ τt+j}T
j=1.





j=1 = θ{˜ kt+j}
T
j=1 + (1 − θ),{ˆ kt+j}
T
j=1
where θ is a number in the range 0 to 1. θ should be small in
order to prevent too much oscillations of the expectations.
3. Check if for convergence by comparing {ˆ k′
t+j}T
j=1 to {ˆ kt+j}T
j=1. If not,
go back to step 2.
4. Verify that the economy has converged to the new steady state well
before T. If not, increase T and start over. If yes, a solution has been
found.
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